Cryptographic Support in a Gigabit Network by Smith, Jonathan M et al.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Technical Reports (CIS) Department of Computer & Information Science 
February 1992 
Cryptographic Support in a Gigabit Network 
Jonathan M. Smith 
University of Pennsylvania, jms@cis.upenn.edu 
C. Brendan S. Traw 
University of Pennsylvania 
David J. Farber 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan M. Smith, C. Brendan S. Traw, and David J. Farber, "Cryptographic Support in a Gigabit Network", 
. February 1992. 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-CIS-93-19. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/456 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Cryptographic Support in a Gigabit Network 
Abstract 
Many applications envisioned for ultra-high-speed networks require cryptographic transformations for 
data in transit. Security has often been an afterthought, and cryptographic support has generally not kept 
pace with performance increases in other network components. Two distinct experimental prototypes of 
high-speed DES boards were built to understand architectural issues in providing cryptographic support 
for the AURORA gigabit testbed. Combining cryptographic support with the host/network interface is 
indicated. 
Comments 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-
CIS-93-19. 
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/456 
Cryptographic Support In A Gigabit Network 
MS-CIS-93-19 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS LAB 17 
Jonathan M. Smith 
Chandler Brendan Stanton Traw 
University of Pennsylvania 
School of ~ n ~ i n e e r i n ~  and Applied Science 
Computer and Information Science Department 
Philadelphia. PA 19104-6389 
February 1992 
Cryptographic Support in a Gigabit Network 
Jonathan M. Smith ( jms@aurora. cis .upem. edu) 
C. Brendan S. Traw ( traw@aurora . c is. upenn . edu) 
David J. Farber ( f arber@c is . upenn . edu) 
Distributed Systems Laboratory, University of Pennsylvania 
200 South 33rd St., Philadelphia, PA 19104-6389 
ABSTRACT 
Many applications envisioned for ultra-high-speed 
networks require cryptographic transformations for 
data in transit. Security has often been an aft- 
erthought, and cryptographic support has generally 
not kept pace with performance increases in other 
network components. Two distinct experimental 
prototypes of high-speed DES boards were built to 
understand architectural issues in providing crypto- 
graphic support for the AURORA gigabit testbed. 
Combining cryptographic support with the 
hostfnetwork interface is indicated. 
1. Introduction 
Network usage and capabilities are both increasing 
at terrific rates. The traffic load on the NSFnet 
backbones in the United States doubles every few 
months; much of this is due to the increased con- 
nectivity provided by interconnection with other 
networks, large numbers of personal workstations 
connected to LANs, and large numbers of comput- 
ers connected via 9600 bit per second (bps) dial-ins. 
Much of this traffic is "traditional" Internet traffic, 
e.g., electronic mail, netnews, and file transfer, 
although a significant percentage of traffic is due to 
remote terminal sessions via rlogin and telnet. Net- 
work capabilities are increasing in a number of 
ways. Most important of these is bandwidth, as 
bandwidth can be spent to achieve a variety of other 
quality-of-service (QOS) goals. In the very near 
future, network technologies with bandwidths near 
1 Gbps will be deployed in several areas of the 
United States [I]. Research into associated techno- 
logies has been underway for several years. 
1.1. Applications of Gigabit Networks 
Among the applications envisioned for such net- 
works are interactive teleconferencing, advanced 
multimedia systems [15] with support for sensory 
data such as tactile data, and advanced displays 
with extremely high-quality imaging capabilities. 
Many of these applications would not be possible 
without large available bandwidths; while video 
streams and images can be compressed, compres- 
sion is only proportional to the underlying bit rate, 
which can be enormous. 
These applications are extremely attractive, as 
they move us towards a world where remote medi- 
cal diagnosis and robotic mining are possible, and a 
world where jet lag may become less of an issue! 
Many more applications can be imagined, and we 
expect that many may become commercialized. 
1.2. Securityff rivacy 
Many proposed applications, however, will not be 
feasible without significant attention paid to the 
issue of security. The need for security, perversely, 
is best illustrated by examples of what could happen 
if it is lacking: 
Medical images are transmitted through a 
switched network, and poor administration of a 
routing point allows the images to be perused. 
Lung cancer is apparent on a particular set of 
images; this data is reported to an insurance com- 
pany for an anonymous bounty, and insurance is 
refused for the imaged individual. 
A Telerobotic command stream is altered to 
introduce subtle defects into a competitor's pro- 
ducts, e.g., automobile transmissions or VLSI 
masks. 
a Monitoring of weather prediction visualizations 
allows foreign grain traders to buy US grain 
futures at a price which hurts US markets after 
the rains arrive. 
Traditionally, security schemes relied on either 
administrative means (e.g., systems with extremely 
restricted access, careful monitoring and audits, 
etc.) or cryptographic support, or some combination 
of techniques. 
1.3. Cryptography 
Since networks, by their nature, require distributed 
control, cryptographic means have somewhat more 
utility than solely administrative means to achieve 
security. A detailed survey of cryptographic tech- 
niques is beyond the scope of this paper, but an 
introduction is available in several books; 
Denning's book [9] is quite accessible. 
The major axes of choice are: choice of 
encryption algorithm, hardware or software imple- 
mentation, and placement in a networking architec- 
ture. Of the methods available which have with- 
stood significant cryptographic attack, the Data 
Encryption Standard [16] (DES) and the Rivest- 
Shamir-Adleman [17] (RSA) schemes seem most 
attractive. While the use of public-key technology 
holds many seductions, the poor performance of 
RSA implementations are a major problem. A 
recent survey of hardware implementations of the 
RSA algorithm[Brickell89] indicates that the fastest 
available implementations are no faster than 1 
Mbps; in fact, the fastest implementation reported 
by Brickell operated at about 50 Kbps. Signifi- 
cantly faster implementations of the private-key 
DES algorithm are available in hardware [lo, 13, 
201 and architectural techniques for further improv- 
ing its performance have been reported [4]. 
The remainder of this paper discusses the 
Aurora Gigabit Testbed [6] and research into the 
issue of appropriate cryptographic support. 
2. The AURORA Gigabit Testbed 
AURORA [6] is an experimental wide area network 
testbed whose main objective is the exploration and 
evaluation of network technologies. The Gbps net- 
work will link four sites: 
a Bellcore's Morristown Research and- Engineer- 
ing Laboratory in Morristown, NJ 
IBM Research's Computer Science Laboratory 
in Hawthorne, NY 
MIT's Laboratory for Computer Science in 
Cambridge, MA 
University of Pennsylvania's Distributed Sys- 
tems Laboratory in Philadelphia, PA 
The logical topology of AURORA is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: AURORA Logical Topology 
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Each of the three lines from sites to central offices 
in Figure 1 represents a logical OC- 12. The point 
of this configuration is to first build independent 
plaNET (plaNET is the follow-on to PARIS [5] ) 
and Sunshine [ l  11 networks. These independent 
networks will be interconnected in order to under- 
stand interoperability of the technologies. Our host 
interface [21] is intended for the Sunshine-ATM 
logical topology. 
The next three sections describe three designs 
for high-performance cryptographic subsystems. 
The fnst two have been implemented and the third 
will be implemented soon. 
I 
Penn 
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3. Exploitation of Parallelism in a Custom DES 
Design 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is the most 
widely used publicly available secret-key algo- 
rithm. Since its introduction [16], DES implemen- 
tations have improved in achieving high encryption 
rates. Computer data communications rates have 
also increased, and today's high-performance com- 
puter networks [I] further increase the encryption 
bandwidth needed to avoid performance bottlenecks 
in systems requiring security. Thus, architectural 
- 
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Office 
rneans to increase DES throughput were studied, 
with the intent of producing a DES implementation 
io satisfy these bandwidth demands. 
The key idea was to use the physical parallel- 
ism possible in a hardware realization to improve 
performance without resorting to exotic technolo- 
gies. When such parallelism can be exploited chea- 
ply using architectural innovations, the exploratory 
research would produce a useful artifact. The cryp- 
tographic subsystem was analyzed as a series of 
levels, ranging from the basic combinational logic 
of a single to the use of overlapped operation of the 
host processor and the cryptographic subsystem. 
The DES is implemented as sixteen "rounds" of 
key-directed encipherment; each round implements 
permutations and substitutions on the 64 bit input 
using the 56 bits of key for selection of the particu- 
lar transformation. The 64 bits of output of a round 
are fed back as input for the next round until sixteen 
rounds are achieved, at which point the 64 bits are 
output. 
At the combinational logic level, where a sin- 
gle round is implemented, the algorithm can be split 
into several parallel computations for increased 
speed. By generating subkeys one cycle in 
advance, the time required can be effectively over- 
lapped with the use of the subkey in the rest of the 
round operation. An additional overlap can be 
made of the two stages of exclusive-or (XOR) gates 
at the expense of increased complexity and gate- 
count. 
Use of multiple round implementations can 
increase computation bandwidth if the DES mode 
of operation chosen does not require feedback of 
ciphertext [19], ruling out all but the Electronic 
Code Book (ECB) method. Unfortunately, ECB is 
known to be susceptible to plaintext frequency- 
analysis based attacks since identical input blocks 
result in identical output blocks. A proposed 
operating method [14] resists this attack yet does 
not require feedback of ciphertext. The basic idea 
they propose is the use of sequence numbers 
XORed into plaintext blocks in a feedforward mode 
of operation. This produces a frequency-analyis 
thwarting many-to-one mapping as well as elim- 
inating dependencies introduced by chaining which 
inhibit concurrent operation. . 
At the board level, concurrent I/O processing 
and DES computation provides for steady-state 
operation of the encryption unit. This can be 
accomplished using double-buffering and a small 
amount of extra logic. In addition to this buffering, 
the use of Direct Memory Access (DMA) for the 
encryption board allows the host processor to con- 
tinue other work concurrently whatever the encryp- 
tion unit is achieving. 
One point worth a slight digression is the use 
of replicated hardware for implementing rounds; 
this provides an interesting range of 
cost/performance relations where realizable. 
3.1. Unrolling rounds into hardware 
Computation elements may be configured to imple- 
ment a fraction of the rounds in a "pipeline"-like 
approach. The main idea is the conversion of the 
iterative "rounds" of DES into a pipeline-like 
stream processing structure, analogous to hardware 
"loop unrolling". This can be accomplished by 
tagging each 64 bit input with the 56 bit key with 
which it undergoes the single-round transformation; 
a round can effectively be thought of as a 120 bit 
wide piece of combinational logic. A single-board 
implementation of the DES requires that the 16 
prescribed rounds of DES be performed on the 64- 
bit data input and 56 bit key input before it is 
presented as output. The 16 rounds mean that 16 
passes through the internal data path of any imple- 
mentation be performed. Such a situation is illus- 
trated in Figure 2: 
key rounds XI 
Figure 2: Single-Board, 16 round DES 
However, if one employs multiple boards, for 
example four, as illustrated in Figure 3, one can 
reduce the number of rounds performed by each 
board. There is a small increase in the logic which 
must employed to manage the keying, but this is a 
second-order effect as far as performance is con- 
cerned. The primary relationship is this: up to a 
maximum of 16 DES units (one per round), there is 
a linear cost/performance tradeoff achievable by (1) 
doubling the number of DES units, and (2) halving 
the number of rounds each performs. For example, 
Figure 3 shows four units each performing four 
rounds. The upper limit is 16 units, each perform- 
ing 1 round. 
3.2. Summary and Implementation Experience 
Figure 3: Four DES units, 4 rounds per unit 
Ignoring second order effects, the major delay is 
induced by a round. Thus, as each "expansion" 
takes place, the unit count is doubled, and the round 
count is halved, meaning that the delay for the first 
bit through the sixteen unit case is almost exactly 
the same as the delay for the first bit through the 
single unit case. That is, at each point on the cost- 
performance line, from one unit to sixteen units, the 
delay through the configuration is unchanged. 
64 
key 
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When keying needs to be updated frequently, 
the pipeline style allows a matching of the datapath 
flow with a parallel keypath. In this way, data 
blocks are accompanied by their key throughout the 
computation. Switching keys between successive 
datablocks without flushing the pipeline is made 
possible since the key and data streams are syn- 
chronized. 
For infrequent key changes, the tradeoff in 
keying interconnection may not be worthwhile as 
compared to maintaining separate key registers for 
each stage of the pipeline. Each round would then 
maintain its own key load (shadow) register in this 
approach. The standard's key shifting sequence 
would be partially executed on each stage. Since a 
partial execution of the key schedule would not 
result in a complete cycling of the keytext, the key 
would be reloaded from the shadow register when it 
had completed its share of the computation on a 
data block. 
64 64 64 64 
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A limitation of the pipeline approach is the 
bandwidth ceiling imposed by the number of rounds 
in the algorithm, sixteen. This means that a single 
pipeline of processors cannot provide more than 
sixteen times the encryption bandwidth of a single 
processor. Additionally, the pipeline suffers in sca- 
lability since the number of stages possible is res- 
tricted to be a factor of sixteen. This deficit is most 
notable when considering an upgrade of a pipeline: 
to gain any increase in bandwidth requires a dou- 
bling in computation resources. 
Parallel aspects of the DES may be exploited at 
three levels: within the algorithm kernel, through 
duplication of the algorithm kernel, and in the 
encryption processor I f0  design. Maintaining con- 
stant throughput rates requires careful consideration 
of the encryption system's interface or input/output 
section. Overlap of the input, output and encryption 
processes of subsequent text blocks provides high 
throughput [23] Similarly, DMA support decouples 
the host processor from the encryption function to 
allow CPU processing of other tasks to proceed in 
parallel with the encryption request [2]. 
We developed a DES board [3] using SSI TTL 
and MSI PALS using the MUX key register 
approach. Testing of a wirewrapped prototype with 
a single algorithm kernel indicated an encryption 
rate of 93 Mbps. An interface to the Micro Channel 
Architecture bus of the IBM RISC System16000 
was also implemented. 
4 
rounds 
This implementation taught us a great deal 
about the internal structure of the DES hardware 
itself, and was a surprisingly successful design 
exercise. Unfortunately, the parts cost of the imple- 
mentation, potential performance limitations due to 
packaging, and the large amount of handwork 
required to replicate the work inhibited us. In addi- 
tion, concurrently with the completion of the work 
and experimental evaluation, very high-speed DES 
chips were both implemented in research labora- 
tories [lo] and announced to be commercially avail- 
able [20]. The availability of such chips both 
removed one of the motivations for implementing 
the board (high performance), and enabled us to 
redirect our energies towards architectural issues, 
such as where the chip should be incorporated. 
4. Current Scheme 
56 
Experience with the wire-wrapped board described 
in Section 3 indicated that high encryption speeds 
were possible, and that architectural solutions could 
provide considerable leverage, independent of tech- 
nology choices for the electronics. However, any 
solution was intended for incorporation in our Giga- 
bit testbed, and thus several replicas were necessary 
for networking experiments, and the negatives 
described above (complexity and handwork) were 
thus even more important. VLSI Technology's 
VM007 encryption chips [20] were chosen as the 
basis for a Micro Channel Architecture bus card. 
4 
rounds 
This chip has a number of important features, 
111ost notably the fact that it can be clocked at 30 
Mhz, yielding Electronic Code Book (ECB) and 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) speeds of 192 Mbps. 
This is entirely adequate for the current generation 
host interface, which operates at OC-3c speeds (155 
M~Ps). 
A key can be loaded in 8 clock cycles, or 
about 0.3 microseconds. Several registers for key- 
ing are provided. 
The Micro Channel Architecture board has 
been implemented and tested, and software support 
has been written. It operates at rated speed, which 
exceeds the maximum transfer rate (130 Mbps) pos- 
sible between the host and Micro Channel Architec- 
ture devices with the current generation Micro 
Channel Architecture I/O Channel Controller. 
The major difficulty with this approach is the 
number of bus transactions necessary to move data 
to and from the network interface. This represents a 
serious performance limitation due more to the 
latency involved in roundtrips than in the bus 
throughput. Section 5.2 discusses alternatives; the 
nature of the traffic is illustrated in Figure 4 
System 
I/O Bus 
Interface 
Figure 4: Bus-Connected Architectures 
5. The right way 
Our experience with the prototypes of Sections 3 
and 4 leads us to believe that a truly high- 
performance encryption subsystem must be incor- 
porated into the hosthetwork adaptor. 
5.1. An ATM host interface 
We have designed and implemented a prototype 
ATM host interface [21] for the IBM RISC Sys- 
tem16000. The host interface is implemented as a 
pair of Micro Channel Architecture boards [7]. The 
Segmenter board serves to convert data objects, 
such as IP packets, to ATM cells. These cells are 
then sent over the network. ATM cells are 48 bytes 
of data plus 5 bytes of header, so that a reasonably 
sized data object (say 8192 bytes) on the machine 
requires many ATM cells to be put on the network 
medium. The Reassembler board takes ATM cells 
from the network and re-aggregates them into data 
objects such as packets. 
Among the functions the Segmenter and 
Reassembler board provides are the computation of 
CRC checksums, multiplexing and demultiplexing 
of virtual circuits, and a small amount (64Kbytes) 
of buffering. The model for the host interface's role 
in a system is this: the host software makes any 
control decisions, while the host interface performs 
cellification, decellification, and any data move- 
ment to and from the host This significantly reduces 
the burden on the workstation, as it is organized for 
data processing, not memory manipulation. 
Figure 5: Segmenter 
- 
ATM 
Header Generator 
5.1.1. The Segmenter 
Data Buffer . SONET Framer 
A block dia.gram of the Segmenter is presented in 
Figure 5. When data is to be transmitted into the 
network, the virtual circuit identifier (VCI) to be 
used is loaded into the header generator. A multi- 
plexing identifier (MID) is also loaded into the 
AAL generator if the data is to be transmitted via 
the Class 4 ATM Adaptation Layer (AAU) [12]. 
The host then sets up a streaming mode [8] (an 
optimized bus transfer mode for contiguous data) 
transfer to move the data which is to be transmitted 
from a pinned buffer in host memory to the FIFO 
buffer on the Segmenter. The location and size of 
- 1 
,+,; 
- 512 by 32 
FIFO 
Segmentation 
Controller 
I he host's buffer are specified during stream set-up. 
While this transfer is being made, the Segmenter 
produces the header check CRC and formats the 
control information into the appropriate ATM and 
AAL4 header formats. As soon as sufficient data 
has been placed into the FIFO buffer, the segmenta- 
tion controller removes the data for the first cell 
from the FIFO buffer and adds an ATM header, 
AAL4 header and AAL4 trailer. If the cell is carry- 
ing AAL4 data, the payload CRC is calculated as 
the data is moved to the SONET framer [18] and 
placed in the appropriate field at the end of the cell. 
This process is repeated until the FIFO buffer is 
drained. 
Linked List 
n 
~e I 
Figure 6: Reassembler 
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5.1.2. The Reassembler 
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The Reassembler is illustrated in Figure 6. It is 
composed of four major subsections which operate 
concurrently. The cell manager, CAM lookup con- 
troller, and the linked list manager (LLM) exploit 
this concurrency to form an ATM cell-processing 
' 'pipeline' ' . 
The cell manager verifies the integrity of the 
header and payload (if the cell is carrying AAL4 
data) of cells received from the network by the 
SONET framer. It extracts the VCI from the ATM 
header and the MID and length from the AAL 
header. We currently ignore the 4-bit sequence 
number in the AALA as we believe it is insufficient 
to provide a reliable means for cell loss detection. 
The body of the cell is placed in a FIFO buffer for 
later movement into the dual port reassembly buffer 
(DPRB). 
The CAM lookup controller manages two 
CAMS which provide lookup support for a total of 
256 simultaneous virtual connections and the 
reassembly of 256 datagrarns. The host is able to 
flush undesired virtual circuits and datagrams from 
the reassembler through the CAM lookup 
controller. 
A reference resulting from the CAM lookup 
operation is passed to the LLM. The LLM, as its 
name suggests, establishes and maintains a linked 
list data structure for each of the virtual circuit and 
datagrams that is being received. Data received 
from the network is placed at the end of the 
appropriate list while data destined for host memory 
is read from the front of the list. 
The LLM allocates space in the DPRB for data 
coming into the reassembler from the network and 
passes the location to the DPRB controller. The 
cell body which was placed into the FIFO by the 
cell manager is removed and written into the 
appropriate reasserrlbly buffer. 
The host is able to read data from a particular 
virtual circuit or datagram by specifying a list refer- 
ence to the LLM which determines the location in 
the DPRB where data is stored. The location is 
passed to the DPRB controller which removes the 
data from the buffer for transfer into host memory 
over the MCA bus. 
5.1.3. Discussion 
Performance of our current architecture is quite 
good; we can send and receive at about 130 Mbps, 
measured by an AIX user process doing 110 to and 
from the host interface. Detailed performance data 
[22] is available. 
5.2. Incorporating Cryptographic support: 
alternatives 
There are essentially two ways in which encryption 
hardware can be employed. One method is to make 
the encryption card generally available for access 
on the Micro Channel Architecture bus, as was 
done for the solutions of Sections 3 and 4. This has 
the advantage that any application can employ the 
encryption hardware, for example, to encrypt and 
decrypt data written to disks, or to provide 
application-to-application cryptographic support. 
However, this approach (as illustrated in Figure 5 )  
suffers from the need to access the bus multiple 
times for each network transaction, e.g., data must 
cross the bus to be encrypted, cross the bus after 
they are encrypted, and if the post-encryption 
transfer is to system memory, a third transfer (into 
the host interface) is required (although this is not 
strictly necessary on the Micro Channel Architec- 
ture as it supports card-to-card transfers). Since the 
considerable bus activity will severely inhibit 
rtetwork performance, this seems somewhat 
undesirable. 
The other alternative is to incorporate the 
cryptographic hardware into the hostfnetwork inter- 
face. This is often used when link encryption is 
desired, but has the drawback that the cryptographic 
hardware is private to the interface. In addition, 
link encryption itself has several drawbacks. First, it 
provides little control for applications, e.g., for cus- 
tomized key choices. Second, it makes key manage- 
ment for arbitrary host-to-host encryption in a 
switched network difficult; packet-switching exa- 
cerbates this problem since headers are encrypted 
and must be readable if used for routing. 
In the next section, we describe a solution 
which combines some of the flexibility of the 
separate card architectures with the high- 
performance characteristics of a link-encryption 
solution. 
5.3. Incorporating Cryptographic Support: A 
high-performance architecture 
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, both the Segmenter 
and Reassembler portion of the host interface are 
broken into several functional blocks, which 
operate concurrently. This hardware concurrency 
permits high-performance solutions to be devised 
using inexpensive technology choices. The 
reassembler, in particular, makes great use of con- 
currency by setting up a "pipeline" which has four 
logical stages. The architectures we propose are 
illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. 
The addition of the encryption chip in each case 
serves to add another functional block, which can 
operate concurrently with the other three blocks. 
Key lookup is done by adding an extra field to the 
"head-of-list" data structure in the pointer 
memory. Extra space for such purposes was 
reserved in the original interface design. These 
"head-of-list" structures are located using the 
CAM with the Virtual-Circuit Identifier as a tag. 
The cryptographic keys are loaded into the VM007 
in parallel with data movement from the Cell 
Manager's data buffer into the Dual Port Reassem- 
bly Buffer. This solution provides the following 
significant advantages: 
Segmentation Controller 
Figure 7: DES-augmented Segmenter 
Figure 8: DES-augmented Reassembler 
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(which ease transport through packet-switched 
fabrics). 
6. Conclusions 
Unless workstation architectures change greatly, 
cryptographic hardware should be incorporated into 
the hosthetwork interface. This adds a marginal 
amount of complexity to the interface and meshes 
quite comfortably with functions it already per- 
forms, such as cellification, decellification, and 
computing checksums. The advantages to this 
approach stem from the fact that neither host 
memory access nor bus transactions are required 
beyond that necessary to move data from the appli- 
cation data areas to the hostlnetwork interface. Key 
management is closely correlated with ATM header 
manipulation, and can be performed efficiently with 
the addition of a small amount of logic in the host 
interface. 
While we have used the DES algorithm to pro- 
totype our experimental solutions, our architectural 
proposals are not dependent on its use; they relate 
to the placement of cryptographic hardware in a 
workstation connected to a high-bandwidth net- 
work. These architectural solutions do not stand in 
the way of application-to-application ("end-to- 
end") privacy, under the assumption that the 
workstation operating system is a "trusted" subsys- 
tem. Distinct keys can be loaded for each ATM vir- 
tual circuit (i.e., each application). 
Many high-bandwidth applications require 
security, especially privacy. These requirements 
will drive transformations in workstation architec- 
tures, especially high-performance communications 
subsystems. Our proposal suggests an engineering 
approach which is both extremely cost-effective 
and provides high performance, while sacrificing 
little in flexibility. 
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